Introduction
Pope Francis, soon after his accession to the See of Peter, was determined to push for a breakthrough with China and to re-activate the nearly three decades long hiatus in Sino-Vatican relations.1 A pre-negotiation joint working group was formed with representatives from Beijing and the Vatican to first thrash out thorny questions before the real negotiations could then take place. The question of the appointment of Chinese bishops was discussed.
The Agreement: Criticism and Opposition
The Sino-Vatican Agreement was officially signed on September 22, 2018. The contents of the Agreement were never opened to the public. The Agreement specified that the government would nominate bishops, while the pope would only have veto power.2
Those who know Chinese politics have reasons to believe that, on the issue of bishop appointments, the veto power of the pope could easily become meaningless. The political environment in China is not conducive to the implementation of the religious freedoms which Sino-Vatican Agreement aims at. Under the authoritarian leadership of President Xi Jinping, religious security has been raised to the level of national security, suppression of religious activities has been tightened, and religions have been placed under the thumb of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).3 The agreement under discussion has been heavily criticized outside of China by those who assert that the Vatican lacks understanding of Chinese political culture, most especially the communist way of understanding religious freedom.4 Taiwan’s China Times unreservedly views the agreement as a compromise which is not in the interests of the Church.5 The New York Times commented that it raised more questions than it answered, adding that the proposed compromise could draw fierce protests from Chinese Catholics.6 Willy Lam, a Hong Kong-based Catholic political commentator, in fact argued that in the end, the agreement will not be honored, given China’s declining record in honoring foreign agreements. Lam noted that because religious security has been raised to the level of national security, the political climate under the Xi Jinping administration is averse to its implementation. In this light, the Vatican should consider whether the PRC is a trustworthy negotiating partner.7 Frank Ching, a distinguished Catholic political commentator, proposed that the agreement would allow agents of the PRC to obtain total control over nominating bishops. “The price is too high,” he stated.8
In January 2018, Joseph Cardinal Zen Ze-kiun of Hong Kong went to the Vatican to discuss issues pertaining to the Agreement with the Pope, in particular, the forced resignation of two legitimate underground bishops and their replacement with two illicit, open-Church bishops. Zen found out that it was Archbishop Claudio M. Celli, the negotiator on the Vatican side, who had asked the underground bishops to stand aside in order to facilitate the negotiation.9 As Cardinal Zen was very much concerned for the underground Catholics, he argued against the course of action taken by officials of the Vatican. In his view, they were out of their element, insofar as they had traditionally dealt with European Communists, rather than Chinese Communists.
The Vatican has issued a series of in-depth articles to explain the reasons for the Agreement and to justify its need for dialogue, negotiation, and the appointment of bishops.10 However, given that the power of appointment would rest in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, whose consistent policy goal has been the extinction of religion,11 the Vatican’s articles do not advance convincing religious reasons to support the proposed Agreement.
In November 2018, Cardinal Zen delivered a new letter to Pope Francis, again stressing the deplorable situation of underground Catholics in China.12 In his 2018 book, For Zion, I Will Never Keep Silent, Zen restated his opposition to the Agreement.13
The Fruit of the Agreement
In 2022, four years after the launching of the Agreement, Archbishop Paul Gallagher, the Vatican’s secretary for relations with states, admitted that the fruit of Agreement “is not terribly impressive.”14
On November 23, 2022, without the Pope’s authorization, the CCP appointed Giovanni Peng Weizhao (彭衛照), the unofficial administrator of Yujiang Diocese, to be the Auxiliary Bishop of Jiangxi. Not only did the government impose this episcopal appointment on the Vatican. In doing so, it overrode existing diocesan boundaries. According to official Church records, Jiangxi Province is divided into five dioceses, one of which is Yujiang. In essence, this move also suppressed those dioceses. Then in April 2023, the government arranged the transfer of Bishop Shen Bin from the Diocese of Haimen to the Diocese of Shanghai, again without Vatican approval, as required by the agreement. The Vatican issued a statement lamenting this unilateral move.15
Agreement: Instrument of Suppression
After the Sino-Vatican Agreement, Chinese Catholics have suffered greater oppression at the hands of CCP religious officials than before it was signed. They have often tried to restructure the Church, creating new dioceses and extinguishing others, sometimes merging smaller, perennially vacant episcopal seats in the process. This has presented Rome with difficult problems.16 To cite another example, in January 2024, Fr. Ma Xianshi (麻顯士), a communist-sponsored diocesan administrator of Wenzhou, transferred priests in the diocese, realigned parish boundaries, downgraded another local diocese to a parish within Wenzhou, and made the decision to ordain certain seminarians, all without the approval of the Vatican-recognized bishop, Msgr. Peter Shao Zhumin (邵祝敏主教). When Bishop Shao objected, he was arrested.17 This is quite serious because it constitutes interference into a religious group’s internal affairs. When the government’s control of religion usurps its legitimate rights, it will lead to the undermining of religion. This is the strategy of the religious freedom policy handed down from Mao.18
In their joint meeting in November 2023, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) and the Chinese Bishops Conference launched a detailed five-year plan (2023-2027) for implementing the Party-state policy of “Sinicization of Christianity.”19 Insofar as “Sinicization” entails subordinating the Catholic Church to the communist concept of what religion in China should be, the CCPA and the CBCC have sold out and undermined the Agreement. This policy is far from the “spirit of dialogue and collaboration” advocated by the architect of the Agreement, Cardinal Parolin.
More recently, three bishops were ordained recently by mutual agreement between the Holy See and Beijing. They are Bishop Wang Yusheng (王躍勝) in Zhengzhou Diocese (鄭州教區) on January 25, 2024, Bishop Sun Wenjun (孫文君) in Weifang (濰坊教區) on January 29, 2024, and Bishop Wu Yishun (吳弈順) in Shaowu Apostolic Prefecture (邵武監牧區) on January 31, 2024. At the same time, there are still Chinese Catholics who have no word of what has happened with their bishops, some who have been missing for several weeks, if not several years.20 Such a record of interference in the Chinese Catholic Church even after the signing of the Agreement proves that the Agreement has not served the interests of the Catholic Church as expected.
Agreement: Success or Failure
In 2023, the Vatican decided to open a new channel to amend the insufficiency of the Agreement. On September 30, 2023, two and half years after his episcopal ordination, Pope Francis elevated the Jesuit bishop of Hong Kong, Stephen Chow Sau Yan, to be a cardinal, a position of high honor in the Church. This appointment derived in part from Bishop Chow’s successful visit to Beijing in April 2023, during which he was able to foster good relations with the government and the Church in China. With the future of the Church in China in mind, Pope Francis handpicked him to act as a bridge between the Vatican and China.21 In an interview, Bishop Chow admitted that not much fruit has been reaped by the Agreement, and he suggested that dialogue and respect would be the way forward in future Sino-Vatican relations.22
Conclusions
The Vatican has been careful to avoid splitting the Chinese Catholic Church into an official sector and an underground sector. Accordingly, it made a significant concession by sharing its authority of appointing bishops with the PRC government. However, given that at present, Xi Jinping’s paramount concern is the submission of religion to government control, the timing of the launching of the Agreement is problematic. To date, the Agreement has not reaped much fruit for the Catholic Church. Indeed, one must acknowledge that the Agreement does not mean that Chinese Catholics are now freer.
Stephen Cardinal Chow Sau Yan of Hong Kong, the new bridging figure between China and the Vatican, suggests that the complex and sometimes contradictory administrative machinery of Chinese religious policy might need time to deal with the Agreement. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, which signed the Agreement, has regarded it as a diplomatic success when it comes to China’s international prestige. Will this problematic Agreement be abandoned or renewed on better terms for the Catholic side? Can the Vatican achieve better results in dealing with China with the assistance of its new bridging figures? This remains a question for international diplomacy to resolve.
Endnotes
- Lisa Jucca, Benjamin Kang Lim, and Greg Torode, “Special Report: After Decades of Mistrust, Pope Pushes for Breakthrough with China,” Reuters, July 14, 2016, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.yahoo.com/news/special-report-decades-mistrust-pope-pushes-breakthrough-china-131020495.html%3fsoc_src%3dsocial-sh%26soc_trk%3dma.
- “Historic Sino-Vatican Deal Set to Be Signed,” UCANews.com, September 19, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.ucanews.com/news/historic-sino-vatican-deal-set-to- be-signed/83376.
- After Xi Jinping became the supreme leader of China on 6 May 2014, he launched 《國家安全藍皮書:中國家安全研究報告2014》in which it stated that the religious security is uplifted to the level of national security. Cf: 劉慧2014《國家安全藍皮書:中國家安全研究報告2014》北京:社科文藝。
- Steven Mosher, “Parolin and the China Negotiations: First, Do No Harm,” One Peter Five, February 22, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://onepeterfive.com/parolin-china-negotiations/. Beatrice Leung, “China’s Religious Freedom Policy: An Art of Managing Religious Activity,” The China Quarterly 184 (2005):894-913, https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574100500055X.
- “主教任命 大陸、教廷達成協議,” China Times, November 1, 2016, accessed October 4, 2024, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20161101000305-260108.
- Jason Horowitz and Ian Johnson, “China and Vatican Reach Deal on Appointment of Bishops,” New York Times, September 22, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/world/asia/china-vatican-bishops.html.
- Willy Lam, “Zhongguo zonggiao xingshi fenxi 中國宗教情勢分析” (An Analysis of the Religious Situation in China) in a seminar entitled “Zhongfan guanxihechuqu 中梵關係何處去” (Where Will Sino-Vatican Relations lead to?) Organized by Peace and Justice Commission Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, November13, 2016.
- Frank Ching, “Vatican Should Tread Carefully in China Dealings,” Japanese Times, December 6, 2016.
- The cardinal revealed details of a private audience with Pope Francis. He mentioned this issue to the author when she had the chance to talk to Cardinal Zen on various occasions between 2018-2023.
- Sergio Centofanti and Fr. Bernd Hagenkord SJ, “Dialogue with China: There Is No Magic Wand,” Vatican News, May 2, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2018-05/holy-see-china-diplomacy.html; Sergio Centofanti and Fr. Bernd Hagenkord SJ, “Dialogue with China: Small Steps toward Mutual Trust,” Vatican News, May 7, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2018-05/holy-see-china-diplomacy-mutual-trust.html; Sergio Centofanti and Fr. Bernd Hagenkord SJ, “Dialogue: Necessary for the Church’s Mission in China,” Vatican News, June 26, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-06/holy-see-china-dialogue-pope-francis-catholic-church-vatican.html; Sergio Centofanti and Fr Bernd Hagenkord, SJ, “Protagonists of Dialogue: Chinese Authorities and the Holy See,” Vatican News, June 30, 2018, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-06/pope-francis-holy-see-china-dialogue-protagonists.html; Sergio Centofanti and Fr Bernd Hagenkord, SJ, “The Vatican and China: Dialogue and Negotiation,” Vatican News, July 3, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-07/pope-francis-vatican-china-dialogue-negotiation.html; Sergio Centofanti and Fr Bernd Hagenkord, SJ, “China and the Bishops: Why Is This Issue So Important?” Vatican News, July 7, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-07/vatican-china-diplomacy-bishops.html; Sergio Centofanti and Fr Bernd Hagenkord, SJ, “Dialogue with China: Apostolic Succession and the Legitimacy of Bishops,” Vatican News, July 17, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-07/dialogue-china-holy-see-apostolic-succession-legitimacy-bishops.html; and Sergio Centofanti and Fr Bernd Hagenkord, SJ, “Dialogue with China: More Fully Catholic, Authentically Chinese,” Vatican News, July 13, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2018-07/dialogue-china-holy-see-fully-catholic-authentically-chinese.html.
- Beatrice Leung, “China’s Religious Freedom Policy: An Art of Managing Religious Activity,” The China Quarterly184 (2005):894-913.
- This author met Cardinal Zen a few days after he returned from Rome delivering the seven-page letter to the Holy Father. “Zen Presents Letter to Pope Warning Him on China,” UCANews.com, November 12, 2018, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.ucanews.com/news/zen-presents-letter-to-pope-warning-him-on-china/83839.
- Cardinal Zen Ze-kiun (Joseph Zen), “為了锡安我绝不缄默” For Love of My People, I Will Not Remain Silent (Hong Kong: Chora Books, 2018). the English version published by Ignatius Press: https://ignatius.com/for-love-of-my-people-i-will-not-remain-silent-digital-lprse/.
- Gerard O’Connell, “Interview: The Future of Vatican-China relations, and Whether the Agreement on Bishops Has Paid Off,” America. July 19, 2022, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2022/07/19/vatican-china-hong-kong-pope-francis-243379.
- “Pope Approves Bishop Unilaterally Appointed by China,” UCANews.com, July 21, 2023, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.ucanews.com/news/pope-approves-bishop-unilaterally-appointed-by-china/102046.
- Ed. Condon, “The Vatican’s ‘Two Chinas’ Problem,” The Pillar, January 8, 2024, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/the-vaticans-two-chinas-problem.
- Michelle La Rosa, “Chinese Bishop Reportedly Arrested after Protesting Communist Changes in Diocese,” The Pillar, January 4, 2024, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/chinese-bishop-reportedly-arrested.
- See note 11.
- 深入推进我国天主教中国化五年工作规划纲要(2023—2027年)微言宗教 2023-12-26 19:54 Posted on 北京.
- Alix Champion, “Despite New Episcopal Ordinations, Chinese Bishops Still Missing,” La Croix International, February 1, 2024, accessed October 4, 2024, https://international.la-croix.com/news/religion/despite-new-episcopal-ordinations-chinese-bishops-still-missing/19104.
- Gerard O’Connell, “Exclusive Interview with Cardinal Stephen Chow,” America, November 3,2023, accessed October 4, 2024, https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2023/11/03/cardinal-stephen-chow-hong-kong-china-246427.
- See note 21.
Image credit: Mirko via Adobe Stock. St. Michael Catholic Church in Qingdao, built by German missionaries.
Beatrice Leung
Beatrice K. F. Leung 梁潔芬 is a religious member of the Sisters of the Precious Blood, a Hong Kong diocesan congregation. She obtained her PhD from the Department of International Relations, the London School of Economics and the Department of Political Science, the University of London. After teaching for nearly …View Full Bio