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Greater China's Great Transformation

In October 1978, I first visited China just before Deng Xiaoping returned to power and the U.S. and China resumed diplomatic relations. Two memories are etched in my mind. First was arriving at the Beijing airport in the only plane on the whole field. It taxied right up to the only door into the terminal, and I walked down the stairs from the plane under a bright spotlight and a giant statue of Chairman Mao. Second was traveling in a car with a driver between two cities in Yunnan for a glimpse of the countryside. We passed a crossroads with a dozen farmers seated on the ground with their produce, and the driver whispered to me, "That's a market, but it's illegal."

Would I have predicted the amazing events that followed over the next 13 years—including the market reforms and Special Economic Zones (SEZs), the 1988 political reform agenda, the 1989 Democracy Movement followed by June Fourth, and then the collapse of European communism by 1991? So, I am kept humble in the face of my task—sharing some thoughts about the next 13 years in China until 2020.

Counter-intuitively—or perhaps just cowardly—I am launching into this article about China's future with some reflections on China's past, motivated by the his-

torian's perennial hope that we might learn something from history that can guide our future steps.

China in the Shadow of Deng Xiaoping

The mindset and timetable that shapes the planning of China's leaders remains Deng Xiaoping's 70-year program of January 1980. Deng reversed the utopian priority on class struggle, instead putting top priority on *economic development* to build up a base for later attaining China's other goals of *unification* and *defense* (of China's interests against hegemony).

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Current government policy should be seen as adaptation and implementation of Deng's strategy, which he himself reaffirmed in early 1992. At that time, the beleaguered leadership debated what to do in the wake of post-June Fourth sanctions against China and the collapse of European communism. Deng made sure that China did not "pick up the baton" of leadership in the cause of world communism against the U.S. but stuck to his nationalist agenda.

• **Goal by 2000:** quadruple China's gross domestic product (GDP) in 20 years (accomplished early), along with the recovery of Hong Kong (HK) in 1997 and Macau in 1999 plus continuing economic integration and political-social assimilation of the Far West.

• **Goal by 2020:** quadruple China's GDP again (also accomplished early), move China into the ranks of "middle income" countries providing a "comfortable" life (*xiaokang*) for the Chinese people, celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) founding (1921). This is the timeframe we are currently considering, and again China seems to be ahead of schedule.

• **Goal by 2050:** ensure full unification with Taiwan, HK, Macau (and the Far West); recover China's historical status as a great world civilization—in time to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (1949). It is not accidental that HK and Macau were granted Special Administrative Region (SAR) status for "fifty years," not in perpetuity.

Deng Xiaoping personally chose Hu Jintao to become successor to Jiang Zemin, who was a compromise candidate reflecting Deng's loss of face in 1989. Hu Jintao, as he consolidates power this fall, will still be operating under the shadow of Deng's program for strengthening the CCP's rule through state capitalism and reform of the bureaucracy. The next set of leaders affirmed in 2012 will include those with greater international experience who may be prepared to make greater departures from the CCP's reform program.

China in the Shadow of Mao Zedong

Some of the challenges facing China are shared by other societies thrust into the intensive globalization underway.

The neoliberal focus on market liberalization has exacerbated inequities in society while weakening the authority of the state and hollowing out redistributive programs for helping the poor. The resulting mixed economy has fueled opportunities for corruption.

However, many of the obstacles to China's achievement of world-class stature are those typical of former communist countries.

- *State domination of the economy, media and education* works against the goal of world-class innovation required to compete in the global economy.

- Rapid industrialization left a legacy of *environmental devastation* and resource inefficiencies.

- *Leninist control by the party over society* through a monopoly of social organizations stifles development of voluntary associations in the Third Sector.

- A *low trust culture* still reflects the black and white world view and resort to power struggle tactics. This fuels the pervasive corruption and abuse of bureaucratic power.

China in the Shadow of the Cross

Reviewing Chinese and church history from 1900-1949 for a recent book project, I have noticed some interesting parallels between 1900-1925 and our contemporary 2000-2025 period. Both timeframes were periods of economic globalization, technological advance, social progress and greater openness to Christianity, both in China and elsewhere. (See box.)

Commentator Fareed Zakaria also saw a parallel between the 1920s and the world today—a prosperous world without a clear political direction. With Britain in decline and America isolationist, "eventually protectionism, nationalism, xenophobia and war engulfed it." I mention these parallels not to predict the same for us today, but to make the point that much of what happened in China came in response to changes on the outside over which China had little influence (much less control)—changes that took Western missionaries and Chinese Christians by surprise.

China's Future

Based on China's modern history, let me offer some of my own predictions to-

CHINA IN THE SHADOW OF THE CROSS

1900-1949

1898—Hundred Days' Reform and suppression

1899-1900—Boxer Anti-foreign Movement and suppression; reopening to West

1905—Abolition of Confucian exam system

1911—Republican Revolution, surge of interest in Western democracy and Christianity

1914-1918

—World War I

1919—May Fourth Movement protesting Western betrayal at Treaty of Versailles, calls for "Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy"

1922—Anti-Christian Student Federation demonstration begins

1925-1927—Death of Sun Yat-sen; reunification under the Nationalist Party, exodus of foreign missionaries

1930s—World depression; rise of fascism including "Confucian fascism" in China, Japan's creeping invasion of China

2000-2025

1988—Comprehensive Reform; **1998**—"Thaw" and suppressions

1999-2000—Falungong movement and suppression; WTO opening up

Around 2005—Private education and property laws

2008—*Beijing Olympics, HK & Taiwan elections, Shanghai Expo*

2010, 2011—100th anniversary of the ROC

2012 and 2017—Next leaders chosen

2019—100th May Fourth anniversary, 30th June Fourth anniversary



Photos courtesy China Partner

ward 2020.

1. *The next five years, 2007-2012, will be an important period for shaping the future cultural and political identity of the Chinese people for a post-industrial, post-communist era, as well as relations with the West. Christians need to be players in the cultural realm. (For key dates as catalysts for change see box.)*

2. Whatever the name of the ruling party—Communist, Democratic Socialist or Christian Democratic—in 2020 China will still be a unitary rather than federal state, authoritarian and elitist, with state intervention in the economy and society and some sort of state-endorsed national belief system.

3. Yet, there will also be more openness

to allowing diversity and autonomy from the state—for social organizations, including faith institutions; for cultural pluralism; and for a confederation with China's outlying areas.

4. Between now and 2020, China will experience some level of national social and political turbulence; the severity will depend mainly on the health of the global economy and northeast Asian politics. This may include:

- rapid growth of political radicalism fueled by local abuses of power;
- an undercurrent of anti-foreign nationalism with outbreaks targeting Christians directly or indirectly;
- Chinese political, even military intervention to protect access to/control

over key resources or territorial claims.

5. Christians may be called on to play a role out of proportion to their numbers in the event of a crisis and transition of political power as has been true in many countries. Evangelical Protestant culture of voluntary association and active citizenship tends to equip Christians to play a democratizing role.

6. Finally, let me suggest the *Singapore Model* as the best-case scenario for China in 2020. In fact, Deng Xiaoping's long-term program, which turned away from the European communist model, was an attempt to replicate the economic takeoff that allowed Asia's "tiger" economies to break through the barrier between underdeveloped and developed worlds, and by closing the gap, to reincorporate Taiwan and Hong Kong-Macau. Jiang Zemin in turn was enamored of the Singapore model under Lee Kuan Yew's benevolent autocracy.

The public face of the model will be state capitalism and mercantilism, authoritarian government, and "Asian values" (a term more acceptable than "Confucian" in Asia's multi-ethnic context) imparted through "moral education" in the schools to complement the growth of a "Research and Development" culture.

A number of these themes are echoed in China under Hu Jintao:

- populist slogans calling on officials to serve the public benefit
- a strategy of balanced development to stem growing inequality
- slogans calling for a "green, scientific, and people's Olympics"
- calls for a harmonious society
- anti-corruption campaigns and Hu's moralistic "8 dos and don'ts"
- creating "world class" universities to fuel innovation for high-tech industry
- government sponsored Confucius Institutes around the world to spread Chinese "soft power."

A recent CCTV special on the "rise of great powers" highlighted science and technology accomplishments rather than social-political institutions or moral values. Apparently, "*Chinese style socialism*" is now nationalism, plus science and technology, plus Confucian values.

Behind the scenes, however, Singapore's success actually reflects a very strong evangelical Christian influence, with forty

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Kay Danielson

Peter Lucinsky

China in Transition: Transition to What?

Transition was a major theme of China for the twentieth century. In that century China saw three major transitions. The first was the end of the dynastic rule in 1911. For the first time in over 2000 years, China was not ruled by an emperor. Everything changed. In 1949, after four decades of fledgling Nationalist rule and chaotic "warlordism," the Communist Party came to power promising to build a new China. Again, everything changed. In 1979, after 30 years of disastrous policies had brought the nation to the brink of economic and social collapse, the Communist Party did an about face and launched the "Reform and Opening" Policy (*gaige kaifang*) that set China on the road to what it has become today. While not conceding an iota of its power, the party abandoned Marxist economics for market economics. Once again, everything changed.

For those of us who live and work in China, transition is part of the air that we breathe. All we have to do is walk around our neighborhoods. I have been in China since 1984 and would never have predicted the China that I live in today. Who would have thought that China would go from semi-legal free markets to Wal-Mart in just 20 years?

With China's growing economic and military might, trying to anticipate or predict where China is going seems to

be a popular activity of late. James Mann, former Beijing bureau chief for the *Los Angeles Times* has just published a book titled, *The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression* (Viking Adult, February, 2007) in which he lays out three potential scenarios for China's future. In April, the Brookings Institution hosted a conference dedicated to examining potential political transformations in China in the next 15 to 20 years.

In February, ChinaSource and the Na-

tional Bureau of Asian Research hosted a conference near Washington, D.C. to look at a variety of scenarios for China in the year 2020. Using a combination of scholarly papers and lectures, scenario analysis participants from business, government and ministry were encouraged to think inclusively and flexibly about the future. It is tempting to see China's development as a straight line. In other words, its recent march towards modernity and economic clout will inevita-

bly continue unabated. Craig Denny, a scenario planning consultant from the Global Business Network (GBN) reminded us that "straight line thinking is risky thinking," and that China has many social, political and demographic challenges which make its future uncertain. "China-focused organizations," he said, "need to consider diversity of futures."¹

Each scholarly paper looked at a particular Chinese sector (economics, society, domestic politics and foreign relations) and then projected three potential scenarios for China in the next 15-20 years. From that, the participants looked at four general trajectories and for each of those, we then tried to identify drivers and "signposts" that might indicate which direction China is headed. Craig Denny defines signposts as "events, developments, trends or data points that can be identified and monitored, and whose presence may signal that a particular path is being taken."²

I would like to identify each of the four scenarios and some key drivers or signposts that we should be watching for that *might* indicate that China is headed in a certain direction.

Scenario # 1: A Strong, Democratic China

In the first scenario, China has emerged as a constitutional democracy with competing political parties and ever-expanding pluralism. One important driver of this scenario would be the expansion of the middle class, creating a large population of stakeholders who are no longer content to have no say in the governance of the country. We would also likely see the growing influence of the returnees from the West as they enter higher level positions in the government.

In order for China to become strong and democratic, it will also need to successfully manage what Dr. Peter Bottelier refers to as the "second economic transition," which he describes as "resetting the national development priority from raw growth to the pursuit of a harmonious society and sustainable growth."³ With a potentially shrinking work force, China needs to shift the basis of its economic growth away from labor intensive manufacturing to service and innovation driven industries. Successfully managing this transition would create a positive en-

vironment for an evolving democracy in China.

Finally we would most likely need to see the abolition of China's two most authoritarian-sustaining systems and policies, namely the *hukou* system and the one-child policy. It is hard to imagine a strong democratic China where the population is still divided into peasants/urban dwellers whose rights are determined by those classifications and where the government still has limits on such a basic human right as child-bearing.

Scenario #2: Chaos and Collapse of Central Rule

In this scenario, a perfect storm of "bad stuff" triggers widespread unrest in the country. As the Communist Party's inability to cope with the multiple crises becomes apparent, the regime's credibility is undermined and central rule eventually collapses. Provinces or military regions may simply break off and go their own way, and the major ethnic groups in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia would most likely take advantage of the chaos to separate. It is the proverbial "doomsday scenario." A likely driver for this scenario would be the failure of the second economic transition which leads to an economic slowdown or even collapse. Alongside an economic crisis, we may see the resurgence of ultra-nationalism and "Confucian fundamentalism" as the Chinese look outward to find blame for the country's problems and inward to find solutions. In his recent novel, *Qi*, (B&H Publishing Group, 2005) David Aikman provides an interesting fictionalized account a radical *Qigong* sect may challenge Party rule.

Scenario #3: "Inner Party Democracy"

In this scenario the Communist Party remains in power in 2020. It is still an authoritarian party that allows no opposition, but within the party "democracy" flourishes as different factions (reformist, hard-line) compete for ascendancy. Successfully managing the second economic transition will be necessary to maintain the stability needed for this scenario to play out. It is also likely that we would see an expansion of socio-political liberalism and its accompanying expansion of civil liberties and creative expression.

Further evidence might be the increased reporting in the Chinese press of the internal party debates on such matters as privatization, rule of law, Confucian fundamentalism and religious tolerance. Should the more reformist faction dominate, we could expect to see a loosening of restrictions on Christianity, and the church increasingly being seen as a positive force for social change.

Scenario #4: Resilient, Authoritarian China

As in scenario #3, the Communist Party remains firmly in control, but this time with a decidedly anti-liberal and anti-Western bent. One of the drivers of this scenario might be the failure to manage the second economic transition, resulting in massive unrest spreading to the urban areas. The regime would have no choice but to use a strong hand to respond to the domestic challenges it faces. In a bid to regain legitimacy lost due to its failed economics, the leadership would increasingly add Confucian ideology to its existing Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (MLM) ideology as a basis for legitimacy.⁴ Evidence of this would be the promotion of Confucianism as a legitimate ideology (if not religion) by the regime and increasing appeals to nationalism and Chinese identity.

While there are some drivers and signposts that are clearly visible and point in a definite direction, at the same time there are a number of "wild cards," outside factors that are so big that they have the potential to derail any of the trajectories. An obvious one would be the declaration of independence by the government in Taiwan, an event that would most likely require the Chinese government to risk everything to stop.

The demographics of China also have to be factored into any analysis of China's future scenarios. The fertility rate, now below replacement level, means that the working population will begin to shrink. A reduced labor force could lead to massive economic disruption and is one of the reasons that China must restructure its economy. At the same time, China's elderly population (65+) is exploding. This population will be supported by fewer people and, therefore, less government money as well. Another

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Samuel Ling

Peter Lucinsky

The Coming, Third Anti-Christian Movement? Learning from Modern Chinese Intellectuals

China has always been an anomaly. She is open to the gospel, she is resistant to the gospel. She is hungry for things modern and Western, she is stubbornly proud of things traditional and Chinese. How do we make sense of all this? More importantly, how do we gauge the mindset of China's intellectuals and leaders? How do they view Christianity as a religion, as a Western cultural construct, as a world and life view?

While most of us living in the West have been fascinated by China's openness to the West in areas such as commerce, technology and diplomacy, there is a subtle development beneath the surface. Confucianism, along with Buddhism and folk religion, is on the rise. If we think that the Christian church is growing in China (what is a more accurate statement might be: the church has begun to plateau, and in certain sectors may be declining), Dr. Fenggang Yang of Purdue University has noted a strong rise in the worship of Confucius and the emergence of Confucianism as a religion:

A strong social movement has begun to revive Confucianism as a religion in China. Moreover, some people are trying to make Confucianism the state religion. The advocates, enthusiasts and reluctant supporters of Confucianism include academic scholars, college students, economic and social entrepreneurs, and government officials.

Can this be true? If it is true, how should the West respond?

Beyond shock and disbelief, we must learn from history. The recent fascination of China's intellectuals with the Christian religion, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, should not blind us to

the fact that this is an exception to the rule, a rare window of opportunity, but viewed from history, certainly not the norm. China's intellectuals have always been resistant to Christianity; in fact we can learn much from two major waves of anti-Christian opposition.

The first wave occurred during the Tongzhi (*T'ung-chih*) Restoration, 1862-74. The two Opium Wars (1839-42, 1856-60) and the unequal treaties afterward had humiliated China before the Western powers and exposed her need to modernize. The emperor was a young child; behind the regency was the Em-

press Dowager who ruled China with an iron hand until her death in 1908. While reform-minded leaders built China's first modern language school (inside the Kiangnan Arsenal; missionary W. A. P. Martin served as principal for a while and recruited fellow missionary John Fryer to teach there) and dealt with foreigners through the *Zongli Yamen* (a rudimentary "Foreign Office"), the Empress Dowager and her eunuch supporters wanted to "move back the clock." She never trusted foreigners. The climax of this reactionary, anti-foreign opposition was the Tianjin Massacre of foreigners in 1870. (Mary Clabaugh Wright's book eloquently states her main thesis in the title itself: *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874*). During this period, China's gentry (scholar-landowners) and officials (the magistrates in the imperial system) opposed Christianity with a vengeance. They designed placards (political cartoons) which depicted Christian bishops as pig-heads (a pun on the term *zhu-jiao*), accused missionary orphanages of gorging young girls' eyes to make Western medicine and misinterpreted Christian baptisms as orgies and the Lord's Supper as cannibalism. The lack of information flowing between missionaries and the gentry contributed to this gross misunderstanding.

The gentry tended to distribute these materials when civil service examinations were conducted in provincial capital cities, when intellectuals and commoners alike would assemble. The point for our discussion is: intellectuals and their magistrate-colleagues opposed Christianity from the vantage point of "traditional Chinese culture." Christianity was seen as a Western, foreign, barbarian religion. When Chinese civilization was threatened, Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism and folk religion joined ranks in the name of Chinese culture to oppose this Western monster called Christianity. [Cf. Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity*, and Lyu Shi-qiang, *zhongguo guan shen fan jiao di yuan yin* (reasons for Chinese official and gentry opposition to Christianity). Both books make the same point.]

While Chinese intellectuals opposed Christianity from the vantage point of traditional "Chinese culture" (an amalgam of at least four traditions), the Anti-

Christian Movement of 1922-27 was a very different affair. This was the period of the May Fourth Movement (1915-27). While China became a republic overnight on October 10, 1911 under the nominal leadership of Sun Yat-sen, power lay in the hands of Yuan Shikai, who betrayed China and made her a puppet of Japan in 1915, and proclaimed himself emperor in 1916. Yuan died in 1917, opening China to a period of civil war among eccentric warlords (1917-1927). Intellectuals who were elated in 1911, sank in despair by 1915-1916. They launched the May Fourth Movement (or the New Culture Movement), under the leadership of Chen Duxiu, Hu Shih, Li Dazhao, Zhou Zuoren and many others (Chen and Li became founding leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921). This movement initially sought to learn from the modern West, in order to forge a generation of "new youth" who would be forward looking, scientifically minded, independent in spirit and would courageously step onto the front stage of China, forging a new, free, modern, democratic society.

While Chen imported modern Western ideas wholesale from 1915 to 1919, students took to the streets and protested against Japan's imperialistic designs

science and reason and is a tool of imperialist aggression. It is very convenient that these intellectuals used a Western tool—Marxism—to oppose a Western religion—Christianity! Joseph Levenson, in his *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*, observed that when Confucianism collapsed in China (the abolition of the civil service examination system in 1905 is a symbol of the beginning of this collapse), the Chinese found it easier to pay for this ruin with a foreign coin (i.e., Christianity). The Christian faith became a scapegoat for the crisis in civilization.

Why review through this history? Because the Chinese Communist Party's religious policy—including her commonalities and differences with the population—can be traced straight back to the Anti-Christian Movement of the May Fourth period (cf. works by Jessie Gregory Lutz and Ka-che Yip, and the doctoral dissertations by Wing-hung Lam, Jonathan Chao and myself). In our contemporary, post-Mao period, opposition to the Christian West remains a convenient tool for the government to rally popular support. (Witness how China responded to the Belgrade Embassy bombing in 1998.) Therefore, a third Anti-Christian Movement may not be so much from "traditional Chinese culture" (but

While Chinese intellectuals opposed Christianity from the vantage point of traditional "Chinese culture," **the Anti-Christian Movement of 1922-27 was a very different affair.**

on China on May 4th, 1919. This turned into a nation-wide strike and boycott of Japanese goods. The May 4th incident symbolized the organization of post-1911 Chinese students into a political force. Many more protests followed until April 12, 1927. In this post-1919 red-hot political environment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in July 1921. In April 1922 (just nine months later), the youth department of the CCP, the "Socialist Youth League," staged the "Anti-Christian Student Federation." Faculty members started a parallel organization: "The Great Anti-Religious Federation." They opposed Christianity from the vantage of modern Marxism: Christianity is contrary to

then with the rise of Confucian religion, this may happen!), nor "modern Marxism" (but then it may). Whatever the ideological foundations, this future Anti-Christian Movement will very likely be a united front between government and people.

How do we respond? First, understand the history of the mindset of Chinese intellectuals (the collaborative volume, *Chinese Intellectuals and the Gospel*, www.prpbooks.com, is a good starting point and can lead to further readings). How do they think? What do they think about Christianity? Today, professional service, acts of compassion and business investment are all wonderfully strategic avenues

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View from the Wall

China in 2020

Huo Shui

In 1900, when the Boxer Rebellion in Beijing aroused the close attention of the various Western nations present in the country at the time, China was a completely poor, backward, weak nation. A hundred years later, in the 21st century, there are very few people who do not care about China. China's economy is growing, its military is becoming stronger and its international influence is increasing. Across the world, there are Chinese people energetically pursuing their various activities. China is no longer synonymous just with Chinese restaurants featuring all kinds of tasty delicacies, or with cheap consumer goods sold in discount stores. China already possesses the power to seriously influence world markets; to affect the decisions of the United Nations; even to shoot down a satellite in outer space or to spread Chinese culture to every country of the world through Confucius Academies. Today, in all corners of the earth, one senses the presence and influence of China.

The Rising Economic Giant

In 2006, China's exports amounted to forty percent of its national GDP, and that proportion is bound to increase by a wide margin in the next decade. From the standpoint of manufacturing, China has an abundant labor force, low wages, skilled technology, good infrastructure and low environmental protection requirements. All of these encourage global manufacturers to move their capital and technology to China. Many high tech companies are moving their research and development centers to China since the cost of employing an excellent Ph.D. there is much lower than in the U.S.

China's infrastructures are not as favorable as those of other Asian countries, but compared with developing countries, they are not bad. Furthermore, the hardware gap between China and developed

nations continues to narrow.

By 2020, more than half of China's cities will have attained the standards of a modern city. The urbanization of China's vast inland region is accelerating, and one third of its population will soon be urban residents. The huge consumer market created by urbanization will become the motivating force for production in China, and this force will continue to accelerate over the next twenty years.

In terms of military strength, China's military expenditures in 2006 made it number four in the world, and by 2020 it is completely possible that China will have the second largest military budget in the world.

enterprises with hard currency. "China buying the world?" This is not a joke; to a large degree, it is already happening and will continue to become a reality.

How has China become such an economic powerhouse? It has taken the Chinese government about 30 years—from 1978 to the present—to wake up the country's 1.3 billion people to the fact that economic development is the only hard fact that can be banked on. China's economic vitality has its origins in the aspirations of the Chinese people to change their living conditions and in the fundamental change in Chinese government economic policy. When the government ceased controlling and planning for every unit of production, the potential that was unleashed is difficult to comprehend—more than a billion people, wanting to do business, were added to the huge domestic consumer market.

By the year 2020, China will have easily become the world power with the largest foreign exchange reserves.

China's stock market has attracted more than a hundred million investors. With the volume of transactions at the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges continuing to increase, the popular feeling is that the market has only just now entered the period of extended growth with its peak still far off in the future. Although it is not clear when China's stock market will reach or exceed the current volume of the New York Stock Exchange, there is no doubt that by 2020 it will have a significant influence upon the currency markets of the world.

Connected with the stock market is the fact that China's foreign exchange reserves have reached one trillion U.S. dollars. How to deal with these reserves has become a serious headache for China's leaders. By the year 2020, China will have easily become the world power with the largest foreign exchange reserves. At that point the best means of spending down these reserves might be for the Chinese to go all over the world buying up the best

The era in which ninety percent of Chinese basically had no purchasing power came to an end; the market economy and protection of private property turned China into one of the world's largest countries that is not capitalist in name but which has a capitalist market economy. Today, the output of the state-owned economy accounts for only one-third of the national GDP. By 2020, this proportion will have fallen to an even lower level.

The rapid growth of China's economy has brought about a significant shortage of raw materials and energy as well as unprecedented pollution of the environment and a huge demand for qualified technical and management personnel. These negative consequences constitute the other side of China's economic development. In reality the Chinese government is taking various measures to bring the speed of growth under control in order to cool off the overheated economy. The question for China's economy over the next twenty years is not wheth-

er it can maintain high-speed growth but rather whether the growth will be steady and sustainable. Whatever the case, China is becoming a world economic giant and will undoubtedly become a full member of the G8 before 2020.

Hobbled Political Reform

In contrast to the rapid economic growth is the Chinese government's sluggish pace of political reform. Over these past thirty years, China has abandoned the planned economy but has undergone no fundamental political change. The centralized government structure with power concentrated in the hands of Party members at each level remains unchanged, the only commendable exception being a change in the allocation of power at the grassroots through village-level direct elections. By casting their ballots, the peasants can decide who will become the village head, but above the village level the township, county, city, provincial and central governments still maintain the old method of the Communist Party appointing leading cadres at each level. The inextricable tie between direct elections at different levels of government and the process of China's democratization is a gigantic challenge that the Party must face, but currently it is still far off.

In terms of social control, although the Party is still at the center of political power in China, it cannot help but adjust many of its former methods due to the numerous social changes brought about by the development of the market economy. For example, the country used to rely on the resident permit (*hukou*) system to control population shifts, with each person's *hukou* determining the scope of his or her activities and social status. The vast majority of the peasant population had no way to gain urban residence registration. Following China's reform and opening, the peasant labor force developed a surplus resulting in a floating population of around 100 million per year migrating from the countryside to China's cities; today, the *hukou* system basically exists in name only. Now one only needs money to be able to buy a home, find a job and live in any city. The country essentially has no means of controlling the floating population.

Moreover, the social control organizations that the Party had put into place

have become completely debilitated in the wake of the unrestrained mobility of the labor force. This phenomenon of the gradual weakening of the Party's political control mechanisms will continue into the future. With a decreasing proportion of workers in state-owned enterprises and the mobility of trained personnel, people's attachment to the state-owned work unit (*danwei*) is gradually decreasing; meanwhile the actual level of personal freedom enjoyed by China's people continues to grow.

However, in terms of Chinese citizens' freedoms of association and speech there still has been no substantial systemic change. The Party and government's methods of controlling non-governmental organizations and public opinion are fundamentally the same. In recent years, state policy toward non-governmental organizations has, as a matter of fact, become stricter; without government background or higher level organizational support it is very difficult to register a real NGO.

In spite of this, due to the growth of the market economy there are exceptions. The large-scale urban housing market has turned many ordinary people into "proprietors" possessing the right to own private property; to protect their rights, many have started "owners committees." In fifteen years, if every urban neighborhood could establish such a committee, and every rural township and village grasped authority through a "village autonomous committee," China's civil society would see substantial progress.

Other than grassroots direct elections, in terms of what can be currently predicted for the basic socio-political structure over the next twenty years, it is unrealistic to expect to see certain political factions allowed and a multi-party system emerge, or a lifting of press controls and implementation of freedoms of speech or other such political structural changes. The Party understands very clearly that if China were to implement these changes, then it would never return to a one-party rule political structure which is, undoubtedly, the simplest way to maintain the status quo.

Concerning values and a guiding political ideology, the Party is gradually abandoning orthodox Marxism while at the same time quietly pondering the Eu-

ropean Social Democrat Party position, drawing closer to the social democratic party.

The biggest difference between the Party and those who insist on following orthodox Marxist teaching is its strong watering down of the concept of social class, transferring the socio-political foundation of the ruling party from the worker and peasant laborers to the newly emerged middle class.

In the next twenty years, the Party will ideologically become a social democratic party but without pluralism; in social administration will increasingly rely on rule of law; in governance will pay more attention to the legitimacy of procedures. These changes are not the realization of constitutionalism in the Western sense but are rather tactics to maintain the Party's monopoly position in the face of pressure. China will continue to be Communist in name while earnestly searching for a future way out.

Indigenous Religion: The Direction of Spiritual Belief and Cultural Development

Culture and belief are an ancient problem in China; there is, to date, no obvious workable solution. China's economic take-off has not lessened, but in fact has deepened, the common people's crisis of faith. Official beliefs have already been thoroughly rejected by the majority. True believers in Marxism have become a minority faction in the truest sense; the replacement for official ideology is a spiritual vacuum or cultural chaos for the great majority of people. The Party urgently needs to address this crisis of faith.

Some advocate using Confucianism to fill the gap. Behind this effort to bring back Confucius is a narrow-minded radical nationalism that resists the process of globalization; the need for theoretical support for this strident nationalism thus constitutes the broad historical backdrop of the Confucian revival. Yet, when all is said and done, the gap between Confucian thought and contemporary society is too great; China is too far down the road in its race to modernize to make a mental about-face. China's modernization cannot be separated from modernization of thought. For this reason a return to Confucianism has no fu-

ture. The government's tacit approval of Confucius veneration only indicates the Party's own perplexity and helplessness concerning the direction of spiritual and cultural development.

Then there is the great effort of Buddhism to gain tacit approval and support from the authorities. The director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, Ye Xiaowen, went so far as to proclaim, "China will be a great Buddhist nation!" These are all an effort to fill the Chinese people's spiritual void while at the same time resisting the infiltration and growth of Western "foreign religion." Christianity in China already has several tens of millions of believers and continues to grow. Chinese religious policy will soon undergo major restructuring, from the former method of strict control to a pragmatic utilization of religion for official ends. The government will permit religion to play a role in charitable work, using religion to help ease some social contradictions. However, as soon as

ment and the common people will be more tolerant of Christianity, and the problem of the legality of house churches will have basically been solved. At the same time, Buddhism will have become the most populous and most influential religion due to its special relationship to the government. Through different kinds of new religions and folk religion, popular religion will also see significant growth with unprecedented competition in the marketplace of belief.

One other change in the cultural sphere is the amalgamation of pluralism and nationalism. Although Confucianism will not be made a "state religion," still, Chinese national culture represented by Confucian thought will receive official support and in a planned way will permeate every aspect of the realm of thought, not only in China but worldwide. Chinese culture will, in a unique way, digest the cultural influences from the West—fashion, the internet, McDonalds and Hollywood will no longer

The year 2020 is not far off, and **like it or not, the rise of China cannot be altered.**

the religious policy changes, the greatest beneficiaries will by no means be Protestant Christianity and Catholicism, but rather the Buddhism and Taoism rooted in Chinese indigenous culture.

Chinese government religious policy will undoubtedly change over the next twenty years with more space opening up for Christian activity. However, Christianity will not become China's mainstream faith due to many problems in terms of cultural identification, the indigenization of theology, church participation in social service as well as the internal management of church affairs. Due to many historical and practical political factors, Chinese Christianity still lacks nationally accepted spiritual leaders and theologians, and the quality of leaders on a local level is mixed. Among the higher level elite and intellectuals in politics, economics and culture, there is still not a large number of converts to Christianity, while the church has yet to become the center of communal social activity at the grassroots or cultural and intellectual center of the village.

In 2020, both the Chinese govern-

be threatening scourges but will be part of everyday life in Chinese society. Attitudes toward family, marriage and sex will see huge transformations, and popular awareness about environmental protection, personal freedom and public health will grow. The demand for energy will force unprecedented conservation by the Chinese.

Yet, the more things change, the more they remain the same. Chinese characters are still like an umbilical cord, linking Chinese people to their culture. "Chinese learning at the core and Western learning for its usefulness" is still the principle followed unconsciously by the Chinese. Young men and women who like wearing jeans, eating hamburgers and chatting online—even they, in the depths of their being, have something in common with the great Confucian master, Gu Hongming, who wore a pigtail at the turn of the 20th century.

China will not lose its place as a great civilization due to the rise of its economy or opening up to the outside world. Chinese characters will no longer be just the purview of sinologists but will be a

required language in brochures advertising scenic tourist spots around the world. The most popular language possessing both beauty and practical value is Chinese; whether or not one is able to grasp Chinese will affect one's prospects in employment and trade. China will become more open and internationalized but will still possess clear traditional Chinese cultural characteristics.

A New Leader in the Global Village

By the year 2020 Sino-American relations will no longer be characterized by hostility over ideology or national defense, but neither will there be a "strategic partnership." The greatest contradiction between China and America will be in competition for natural resources and energy. The trade relationship between China and Europe will grow closer. China is destined to supersede Japan as the regional leader in Asia; the development of India will not constitute a challenge to China; and Hong Kong will increasingly possess the characteristics of China. Taiwan returning to the Mainland is out of the question, yet so is its becoming independent; the cross-strait relationship will grow more intimate as opposed to the two sides drifting apart. In order to amass more natural resources and open up more markets for Chinese goods, China will become involved in Africa on an unprecedented scale. Chinese goods will command a significant share of the market in the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America. Although China is not yet used to its new role as a leading member of the global village, nonetheless, China will expand the depth and scope of its participation in international affairs to the extent that it will not be possible to exclude China in the resolution of any major international issue.

The year 2020 is not far off, and like it or not, the rise of China cannot be altered. The question is: "What does the transformation of China mean to the world? What means should the world use to influence China's transformation?" These are questions that must be considered by all.

Huo Shui is a former government political analyst who writes from outside China. Translation is by Brent and Jasmine Fulton. ■



Peoples of China

China's Changing Population

Kay Danielson

In any attempt to analyze China's future, the country's demographics are part of the picture. Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, of the American Enterprise Institute, paints a bleak picture of the demographic challenges that China faces, highlighting three.

First of all, the fertility rate is now below replacement, meaning that by 2015 the aggregate size of the working population will begin to shrink. The working age population (15-64 years) will top out at one billion in 2015, with 20 percent being between the ages of 15 and 24 and decline thereafter through the mid 2020s. Given the fact that China's economic development and growth is built on its huge labor force, this could lead to massive economic disruption and is one of the reasons that China must restructure its economy.

Second, China is experiencing a population explosion among the elderly (65+). Due to the shrinking working population, however, these elderly will be supported by fewer people, and by extension, less government money. By 2020, the elderly will account for 17 percent of China's population (approximately 243 million people). Eberstadt predicts that by 2020 thirty percent of women who are 60 or older will have no born sons. In a society where the sons have traditionally had primary responsibility for taking care of the elderly, the implications of this are immense.

The third major demographic challenge is sex ratio imbalance. A sex ratio of 105 male births to 100 female births is normally required to maintain demographic stability, but China's official ratio now stands at 119:100, with some provinces having even more drastic imbalances. Jiangxi is thought to be at 130:100 and Jilin Province at 120:100.¹ It does not take a lot of imagination to picture the instability that will be fos-

Urban Growth Scenarios

(Population in Millions)

	Known		Forecast		
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
National Population					
Assuming 0.7% growth per year	1265.8	1306.3	1352.7	1400.7	1450.4
Population increase per year		8.1	9.3	9.6	9.9
Urban Scenario 1					
Assuming 3.5% growth per year					
Urban population	458.6	561.6	667.0	792.2	940.9
Urban %	36.2	43.0	49.3	56.6	64.9
Net rural-urban migration per year		18.1	18.0	21.3	25.3
Urban Scenario 2					
Assuming 4% growth p.a.* in 2005 – 2010 and 3.5% p.a. after					
Urban population	458.6	561.6	683.3	811.5	963.8
Urban %	36.2	43.0	50.5	57.9	66.5
Net rural-urban migration per year		18.1	21.2	21.8	25.9
Rural Scenario 1					
Rural population	807.3	744.7	685.7	608.5	509.5
Rural %	63.8	57.0	50.7	43.4	35.1
Rural population increase per year		-12.5	-11.8	-15.4	-19.8
Rural Scenario 2					
Rural population	807.3	744.7	669.4	589.2	486.6
Net rural-urban migration per year	63.8	57.0	49.5	42.1	33.5
Rural population increase per year		-12.5	-15.1	-16.0	-20.5


*p.a. = per annum

tered in a society where potential wives for so many young men simply do not exist.

In addition, an estimated 60-65 percent of China's people—nearly one billion—will live in cities. These cities will be growing by around 30 million people per year, 25 million of which will be due to rural-urban migration. Most of the 200-250 million peasant migrants will live in the Pearl River Delta, with lesser concentrations in the Yang-

Continued on page 13

Estimated and Projected Population Structure of China: 2000 vs. 2020



Note: Medium variant projection.

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision* and *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>, Thursday, February 08, 2007; 9:26:06 AM.

Book Review

Preparing for the Future: A Tool for Strategic Planning

China 2020: Future Scenarios, A workshop report prepared by The National Bureau of Asian Research; held February, 2007 in Warrenton, Virginia. Forthcoming from ChinaSource.

Reviewed by Tiger Lily

In February, a group of China experts met in the U.S. to consider possible scenarios of what China would be like in 2020. The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and ChinaSource organized the interactive workshop with a view that it would enhance participants' ability to lead their organizations' strategic planning processes.

The main argument is that "straight line" extrapolation based on positive current trends is risky because China faces significant social, political, economic and demographic challenges, and the future is anything but certain. Participants concluded that any potential future for China is one in which their organizations have plenty of opportunity for making positive contributions. However, some expressed that their organizations may not be prepared for certain eventualities mapped out in the scenarios.

The alternative futures were evaluated across four strategic dimensions, namely domestic politics, economics, foreign relations and the social or cultural realm. Out of these scholarly reports, four alternative scenarios were constructed. Discussions ensued and small groups assessed how the four futures evolved by identifying trends, drivers and signposts for each as well as the threats and opportunities presented in each scenario.¹

The keynote presentations that dealt with the issues of demographics, rural-urban migration, and China's past, which shapes its present, have already been presented in the articles in this issue. In ad-

dition, a summary of the four scenarios resulting from the sessions has also been provided. Therefore, this review will focus on the commentary that dealt with how this scenarios analysis is helpful in organizational strategic planning. It will also consider what else, perhaps, could have been done or should be included in future forums so that the results of such discussions will be even more helpful, especially for organizations and other related stakeholders in China.²

In all likelihood, very few organizations would have had the resources, foresight and will to have organized such a forum or to take advantage of such a meeting and factor the considerations into their strategic planning. For many organizations, their mission³ is unlikely to change, even with all this information in hand, and rightly so. However, this information is more likely to impact strategic planning and decisions at both the organizational level and on the ground. While it is the vision and mission of an organization that directs its course and drives its operations, a successful and effective organization will have thought about the future and made plans for alternative futures. Thus, it is in a better position to recognize and seize opportunities. I agree with one of the facilitators that for many organizations it is not so much the lack of opportunities, but rather the right choice of opportunities to pursue. This, in turn, results in allocation of time and resources which, we would all agree, are limited. In deciding on which opportunities to focus on, an organization should ask, "What is our mission?" or "What is our core business?" Then, to be better prepared for the future, it needs to make the appropriate adjustments, especially in strategies and alloca-



tion of resources.

Whichever scenario is forthcoming in China's future, there are opportunities for ministry. These may be in the training or mentoring of local believers; in education, theological or otherwise; in social services, with intellectuals, professionals or business

people. Apart from these, many foreign organizations would have to either "reinvent" themselves or find themselves irrelevant as the Chinese are able to do, and would take over, much of the work that many foreign NGOs (or other platforms) are now doing, given an open democracy scenario with active indigenous NGOs (or other institutions). In such an eventuality, it is not necessarily a bad thing for those organizations affected as we do want to see the rise of indigenous leaders and ministry. The issue then would be whether foreign organizations would recognize the time to let go and let the Chinese take the lead.

I am inclined to agree with one of the keynote speakers that China's leadership will more likely choose a Singapore-type model of increasing freedom in the economical sector with growth in the economy and, to some extent, in the social/cultural sphere. However, it is unlikely to loosen its grip on political control, preferring to have a stronger authoritarian (as opposed to a constitutional democracy) rule with Confucian values. With the handing over of the fourth generation leaders to the fifth generation this year, the rise of Chinese businesses, the promotion of Confucianism both at home and abroad, the current attitude of the authorities towards Christians (and other religious groups) and NGOs, and the increasing growth in the number of returnees from abroad, the next few years will, indeed, be key in shaping China's future.

Believers need, and will continue to

need, professional and management skills as well as ideas for new ways of impacting society other than through traditional religious structures. This is true for both foreign and local believers. In addition, there is a lot of social capital in the Chinese/Asian Diaspora that is still untapped. It would be important for organizations to work with the Asian Christian identity and networks given the influence of overseas Chinese Christians in shaping the growth of the church in China. This would include some of the overseas Chinese church networks and regional Asian networks—church, business or otherwise. Some are already involved in setting up new models of church as the political climate makes it harder for traditional models to grow or accommodate growth. This is unlikely to change anytime soon. This means that organizations, where possible, should explore or continue to explore new models of church with local leaders, especially in the marketplace and businesses given the potential of the growing impact of Christian professionals, intellectuals and business leaders in the community.

This leads to my concluding comments on the forum. Interested organizations would benefit further if other stakeholders would give their input in perhaps a second forum, say at one of the China-related conferences. Most of the participants in the February forum were from, or based in, the U.S. Accurate maps are drawn as one surveys the terrain and topography viewed from different angles and perspectives, perhaps with various lenses. In the same way, input from other major stakeholders, in a separate closed-door meeting, would add further value and a broader perspective. These stakeholders would include Asians and especially Chinese (based in China or Greater China) intellectuals, business leaders, policy makers (also Asians involved in public policy who are focused on China-relations), church network leaders from both urban and rural areas, some from the European Union (China's number one trade partner and its largest technologies provider)⁴ and other major organizations with work in China. This may then narrow the possible scenarios, fine tune them or even broaden them. In any case, the discussions would have a dimension broader than just Western; they

would provide an indigenous and on-the-ground dimension that would be of greater help to the organizations, especially since the majority in this proposed group are major players or involved in casting vision, strategic planning or implementing strategies. They have more direct impact upon, and contact with, the Chinese and the indigenous church.

One other major player to watch out for would be the Middle East. Starting in 2005, there has been an escalating dialogue between Asia and the Middle East. Since then, many bilateral trade agreements have been signed, or are soon to be signed, and other cooperative efforts have been agreed on.⁵ With the current state of affairs between the West and the Islamic world, one can only extrapolate that this Asia-Middle East relationship will continue to grow. China, as with major economies, is heavily reliant on the energy resources in the Middle East. Given that China's main trade partners have a Christian heritage, how will growing interaction between Asia and the Middle East and the possible rise of Islam in Asia then affect China and foreign organizations operating in China?⁶ Perhaps, when future forums, similar or modified, are held in a few years' time, it would be wise to include Christian scholars on Islam and/or representatives from the Middle East.⁷

Of course, among all the wild cards that the report mentions, there is always one wild card in the believers' favor that is not mentioned: that is the mysterious way in which God works, and how prayer is strategic fuel for positive change!

Endnotes

1. The report provides definitions for the following terms:

- Trends—A series of unfolding events that move in a general direction or consistent pattern (e.g. market-oriented economy).
- Drivers—Motivators for certain courses of action; forces of causation (e.g. China's entry into the WTO has caused greater economic integration).
- Signposts—Key identifiable and quantifiable indicators that show direction, either change or constant direction (e.g. a national savings rate of < 15% shows increased domestic consumption).
- Wild cards—Discontinuous events that impose internal or external shocks in ways that could change prevailing trends, or even become drivers or new trends (e.g. pandemics or

breakthrough invention).

- Fixed conditions—Factors consistent across a range of scenarios (e.g. demography).
- Stakeholders—Individuals, classes or entities that are either significantly active or passive as inputs to the drivers (winners or losers).

2. Other stakeholders include the local leaders, business leaders and even other Chinese networks.

3. The mission and vision of an organization should not change because that is why it exists in the first place. However, over a period of time, if after such an assessment, the leaders realize that they could become irrelevant in the next five, ten or twenty years, they might want to review their mission and vision, not just their strategies. In this case, the organization may then go for change in a big way and "reinvent itself."

4. http://english.china.com/zh_cn/business/foreign_trade/11021616/20070131/13913886.html and http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/IA30Cb01.html.

5. This includes social/cultural aspects such as education and cultural exchange programs.

6. Track the news on certain websites such as that for Gulf in the Media, AMED and PINR, and you will see the trend of growing cooperation between the two regions, which of course includes China, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

7. Given that the more mature local churches or those with ample resources are moving in the direction of cross-cultural ministry and realizing their own impact on the world (whether one sympathizes with the well-known "BTJ" movement or not) this would be wise.

Tiger Lily has been in various leadership roles that involve vision casting, strategic planning, networking, implementing strategies and leadership training. ■

China's Changing Population continued from page 11

tze River Delta, Fuzhou, Jinan, Shandong, Beijing, Kunming and Chongqing. The demographic trajectory between now and 2020 is quite clear. By 2010, China will be half urban and half rural, climbing to 56 percent urban by 2015. The floating population will pass 200 million by 2009, 250 million by 2013, and approach 300 million by 2016.

Endnotes

1. Eberstadt, Nicholas. Presentation at the National Bureau of Asian Research conference, "China 2020: Future Scenarios, Arlie Center, Virginia, February 2007.

Kay Danielson has lived and worked in China for 18 years and currently works in the field of cross-cultural training. ■

China in Transition continued from page 5

major factor is sex ratio imbalance with the number of male births greatly exceeding those of females. The lack of potential wives for so many young men has the ability to create much instability.

On the final day of the conference, the leaders of ministry organizations and foundations in attendance looked at what impact each of these scenarios might have on our ministries and tried to evaluate whether our ministries were capable of understanding and adapting to a changing China. Out of that discussion, four key questions and conclusions emerged.

1. China is going to change. Are we as leaders able to see, understand and respond accordingly? Or, is our thinking and understanding of China still as it was, perhaps in the 80s or 90s? Ministries need to have processes and personnel in place that will help keep them current on China.

2. Is a narrow focus on religion hindering our ability to see and understand the shifting realities of China? Whether we are involved in training of house church leaders or discipling university students, it is very easy to become so focused on our niche that we completely overlook the currents and trends that are influencing society at large.

3. Are we too easily overwhelmed by the expansion of opportunities? As China changes and society continues to fray at the edges, the potential needs explode. From caring for orphans to educating migrant worker children to helping the elderly, the ministry opportunities are almost limitless. But we are not all called to be involved in every ministry. As these needs grow, it is important for ministries to have a clear sense of their own calling and mission, lest they be tempted to do everything.

4. What threats and opportunities are presented to the church by each scenario? We need to have a clear understanding of how it can and should respond to the transitions that are likely to take place in the coming years.

While we can only anticipate and somewhat blindly predict the transitions that China will go through in the next 15 to 20 years, there is a promise that is not dependant on scenarios and that was given to us through Habak-

kuk: "Has not the LORD Almighty determined that the people's labor is only fuel for the fire, that the nations exhaust themselves for nothing? For the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the LORD, as the waters cover the seas" (Hab. 2:13, 14). China will be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the LORD, no matter what the nation transitions to.

Endnotes

1. Denny, Craig. "Scenarios to Strategy" presentation at the National Bureau of Asian Research conference, "China 2020: Future Scenarios," Arlie Center, Virginia, February 2007.
2. Ibid.
3. Bottelier, Pieter. "China's Economy in 2020: The Challenge of a Second Transition." Paper presented for the National Bureau of Asian Research conference, "China 2020: Future Scenarios," Arlie Center, Virginia, February 2007.
4. Yang, Fenggang. "Cultural Dynamics in China Today and Possible Scenarios Around 2020." Paper presented for the National Bureau of Asian Research conference, "China 2020: Future Scenarios," Arlie Center, Virginia, February 2007.

Kay Danielson has lived and worked in China for 18 years and currently works in the field of cross-cultural training. ■

The Coming, Third Anti-Christian Movement? continued from page 7

to bless the people of China. However, America's evangelicals involved in these enterprises (or in supporting them) are woefully inadequate in understanding Chinese intellectual history. Will we make up for homework undone?

Second, we need a strong biblical apologetic, coupled with strong compassion for Chinese people. The late Francis Schaeffer's apologetic is a good example for us to follow; Schaeffer took the apologetics of Cornelius Van Til and made them understandable. Schaeffer's wife, Edith, made this apologetic understandable through acts of hospitality and a lifestyle characterized by compassion and community. Schaeffer's slogan was: honest answers to honest questions. Schaeffer's conviction was: the Bible is authoritative and provides the foundations for all Christian answers to questions from non-Christians.

Often, sincere calls for dialogue, understanding and a positive, friendly ap-

proach to Chinese thought have not been based on a truly biblical apologetic, nor a serious study of the history of Chinese intellectuals and their world-view. It is more often based on good intentions than anything else.

Third, we need a cautionary word concerning efforts to build common ground, "bridges of understanding," which depict the Bible and the Confucian classics as depicting the same God, especially the same "general revelation." We must distinguish between God's revelation, which is clearly seen in the human heart and in the created universe (but without words! Psalm 19:1-4, Romans 1:18-21), on the one hand, and the "elementary teachings of this world" (Col. 2) which reflect man's suppression of the truth (or general revelation, Romans 1:18-23). God's revelation is downward (from God); philosophy is upward (from sinful men and women whose minds and hearts are distorted by sin). Human philosophy is always idolatrous; China needs a fresh hearing of God's word—not humanism rehashed in the name of Christianity.

We can be compassionate toward people (Chinese intellectuals), yet not compromise on the Bible's position on human thought (Chinese thought). We must not confuse compassion and a listening heart with compromise with man-centered worldviews. Could this be one of the weak spots in American theology and missions today?

If Christians from the West are to provide a compassionate, strong, biblical response to China's intellectuals—especially if a third Anti-Christian Movement is on the rise—then serious study of history, sound doctrine and apologetics, coupled with the ministry of hospitality and compassion (what I have been calling the "Mashed Potato Hospitality" which I enjoyed from American Christian families since my arrival here in 1965) are not options. They are indispensable.

Samuel Ling, Ph.D., is a theologian and observer of theological and cultural trends that affect the Chinese church. He is president of China Horizon, a theological teaching ministry in Asia and North America, and was the founding director in 1994 of the China Service Coordinating Office, a predecessor organization of China-Source. ■

Resource Corner

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Intercessory Notes

Please pray

1. **That Americans serving in China will be able to separate out biblical principles from the "American way" and serve in a culturally appropriate way.**
2. **That those serving in China will focus their efforts on supporting and training indigenous leaders** for indigenous projects and move out of the way so that indigenous people can serve.
3. **That mainland Chinese Christians now overseas**

will be able to get leadership experience in all fields.

4. **That those serving in China will be able to see, understand and respond thoughtfully, wisely and biblically** to the many changes that are occurring and that will influence Christianity in the future.
5. **That with many changes and opportunities, ministries will have a clear sense of their own calling** and mission lest they be tempted to do everything.
6. **That God will raise up godly leaders** within the country.

Greater China's Great Transformation

Continued from page 3

percent of parliamentarians being Christian (compared to less than ten percent in society as a whole). These individuals reflect an expanding and influential Asian Christian network that includes Hong Kong and Taiwan Christians.

Key Issues for Serving in China

Looking to the future, in light of the past, what are some key issues for serving in China?

1. *Political and economic trends worldwide* greatly affect China. In the 1920s and 1930s, China missionaries and Chinese Christians were not prepared for the swing toward radical politics and military violence as warlords battled for territory and the elite turned away from the "Christian" West in disappointment over its inaction in the face of Japanese aggression. Dependency on mission funds, policy direction and institutional management made Chinese Christians vulnerable to criticism and suspicion that they were "traitors," not patriots. They had neither the confidence nor the vision to transform society.

2. *Underlying currents of nationalism*, ambivalence toward the West and anti-Christian biases will become a greater problem for two reasons. Hyper-nationalism is emerging among today's youth, who are finding their personal identity in the cause of a "rising China." These pampered single children, unlike their parents or older siblings, have been isolated from China's internal poverty and repression growing up in the bubble of coastal affluence.

Populist and socialist concerns for the poor are aroused by the neo-liberal ap-

proach to globalization which is fostering the perception that it causes growing inequities and corruption. Some Chinese will be joining the worldwide anti-globalization movement. To what extent are Christian institutions identified with the winners or with the losers in the global market?

It is important to separate out biblical principles from the "American way," move faster to get out of the driver's seat and focus our efforts on *supporting and training indigenous leaders for indigenous projects*. There is an urgent need for mainland Chinese Christians now overseas to get leadership experience in all fields.

We need to work closely with the *Asian Christian identity and networks*. In God's providence, much of the early modern educated Chinese Christian middle class ended up overseas and is now shaping the growth of the church in China.

3. *The whole cultural realm is our field to plow*. We cannot just focus narrowly on "religious work" in China—evangelism and discipleship, church-planting, pastoral training—assuming that this will automatically influence society in a positive direction. We need to be thinking: Who is the competition? Who are our allies?

The Chinese church as an institution is likely to remain vulnerable and marginalized, even as believers and their families and networks grow in influence. Several factors inhibit the church's influence: the old-fashioned official church; suppression of the house church; the intellectual elite's aversion to church. Exploration of new models for the church are much needed.

As we work in the context of cultural globalization, we will realize the importance of *the affective ties of relationships across*

borders. When we apply business models to doing or funding ministry, we may gain accountability and efficiency but may also be shifting the orientation to goal achievement and impersonal relations.

Conclusion

Christians in China are called to be *salt and light* in the larger society suffering from spiritual poverty in the midst of material prosperity. "Chinese people want a better life but feel lost in a cold, utilitarian society." Corruption is endemic; how do we help our brothers and sisters address this need?

The first step would be to pray for continuing miracles of God's mercy as He preserves China for His purposes. We can all join the "One Million Intercessors by 2007" movement (see www.prayforchina.com). Most immediately, we can pray for God to raise up godly leaders through the promotions underway for the next five year Party and People's Congresses this fall and next spring. In addition, we can pray for the growth of the Kingdom through the Olympics events.

Note: For further reading, the Global China Center website (www.globalchinacenter.org) has a short list of good articles and books spotlighting the "rise of China."

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